A Syrian intervention in Lebanon would be too costly for Damascus

In recent weeks, United States President Donald Trump has repeatedly floated the idea of Syrian intervention to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon. Washington clearly wants to keep this option at its disposal as yet another pressure point against Iran.

But Damascus has stronger reasons to reject military intervention than those that might push towards it. Sending its forces across the border could strengthen Hezbollah politically, destabilise both countries and expose Syria to Iranian retaliation that could reach its capital.

So far, there is no declared and comprehensive American vision of what is expected of Damascus. Intervention, at its most limited, could mean tightening control over the border, curbing the smuggling of weapons and fighters, and sharing intelligence with the Lebanese army. The more dangerous scenario would involve Syrian forces entering to take part in disarming Hezbollah or taking control of its areas in southern Lebanon.

Trump’s repeated mention of the idea appears closer to an exercise in political pressure than to the unveiling of an imminent military operation. Raising the prospect of a Syrian role confuses Hezbollah’s and Iran’s calculations, demonstrates the multiplicity of American options, and increases pressure on the Lebanese government to prove its ability to place all weapons under state control.

But what may look like a low-cost option for the US or Israel is entirely different for Syria, which would bear the cost of human losses and security repercussions, in addition to the risk of returning to regional conflict at a time when its new leadership is betting on stability, economic recovery and attracting investment.

Syria possesses some capacity to act. It has a long border with Lebanon, which means its forces can easily cross into Lebanese territory. In addition, factions that are now part of the new Syrian army previously fought Hezbollah and are familiar with some of its methods and areas of deployment.

But this is not sufficient to wage a broad operation. The Syrian army is still in the phase of unifying factions and organising command, armament and deployment. The state faces internal security and economic challenges. Opening an external front risks draining key state resources needed to continue developing state institutions and services.

The Syrian armed forces can carry out limited operations along its borders, close smuggling routes and tunnels, and prevent armed groups from infiltrating. But they would face difficulty holding areas inside Lebanon or managing a war of attrition in populated environments. Entering Lebanon may be easier than defining the conditions for leaving it, especially if withdrawal becomes linked to a political settlement which Damascus cannot alone secure.